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Abstract 
In order to contribute to the debate about social entrepreneurship, we take an empirical 
perspective and describe the phenomenon in a specific temporal-spatial context - that of 
Catalonia, Spain, during the financial crises of the early twenty-first century. For this 
aim, we conducted 43 in-depth interviews with social entrepreneurs, launched a web-
based survey with 90 responses, and built a database with 347 organizations and/or 
ventures settled in Catalonia with an explicit social/environmental goal. The data show 
that many social/environmental initiatives emerged during the economic crisis, either as 
a self-employment alternative to unemployment, or as a commercial venture started by 
non-profit organizations as a reaction to the reduction in public expense in this sector. In 
addition, the crisis fueled the emergence of ventures oriented to non-market exchange 
and social currencies. As a whole, we argue that this new reality can be conceptualized 
as the emergence of an unsettled Strategic Action Field (SAF) where banks, business 
schools and public administrations alike promote the label of “social entrepreneurship” 
through awards and startup services, whereas other groups claiming the same 
social/environmental goals contest this market-oriented definition of the field. 
Keywords: social entrepreneurship, social economy, non-profit, economic crisis, 
strategic action fields, transformation, Catalonia. 
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Introduction 
Continuous debate among academics about what social entrepreneurship is cannot only 
be attributed to the fact that conceptual academic articles greatly outnumber the 
empirical ones (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009), but also to the fact that the public and 
private institutions that promote social entrepreneurship are keen to provide routine, 
prescriptive definitions of social entrepreneurship, namely, those individuals, 
organizations or ventures that achieve their social/environmental mission by market-
oriented means, using innovative solutions, and reaching a high impact (Dacin, Dacin, 
& Matear, 2010; Dees, 1998, 2007; Mair, 2010; Seelos & Mair, 2005; Zahra et al., 
2009). This definition has been described as tautological (Santos, 2012), promoted by 
consultants and foundations (Hervieux, Gedajlovic, & Turcotte, 2010), and both vague 
(Defourny & Nyssens, 2010) and difficult to measure (Young & Lecy, 2014). In fact, 
consensus among academics and practitioners is limited to the achievement of 
social/environmental goals by market means, while what a social innovation is or how 
to measure social impact are issues subjected to debate (Manetti, 2012; Pol & Ville, 
2009).   
In this article we contend that social entrepreneurship can be acknowledged as a field of 
entrepreneurial/self-employment activity, that (at least in the case of Catalonia, Spain) is 
promoted by public policies in a context of welfare state recession, and supported by a 
similar network of resources as is available for “commercial” entrepreneurs (Austin, 
Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006; Meyskens, Robb-Post, Stamp, Carsrud, & Reynolds, 
2010), such as business training, business incubators, credit opportunities, awards, and 
business events. In order to conceptualize this reality better, we will adopt the Theory of 
Strategic Action Fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; cf. the introduction to this special 
issue). A Strategic Action Field (hereafter SAF) is defined as “a meso-level social order 
where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with knowledge of one 
another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the 
relationships of the field (including who has power and why) and the field's rules” 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011, p. 3). As we will argue below, we can conceive the field 
of social entrepreneurship as an emergent SAF in which there is little consensus about 
the logics of the field. In such an unsettled SAF, banks, foundations and business 
schools, aided by public policies promote the label of “social entrepreneurship” as the 
natural market-oriented response to societal challenges. Following the SAF 
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terminology, these actors can be labeled as the incumbents of the field, the dominant 
actors who determine the interest and positions in the field. In this case, the public 
administration plays a secondary role in terms of funding but it plays an important role 
in governance, providing the means for an effective coordination, dissemination, and 
promotion of the social entrepreneurship programs.  
Contesting this market-oriented definition, we also find ventures claiming 
social/environmental goals, organized as cooperatives that foster alternative views on 
how to address societal challenges, i.e., through social currencies and self-provisioning. 
Following SAF’ terminology, we might refer to these actors as opponents. We herewith 
show that entrepreneurs may use the label of “social entrepreneur” in this field because 
of the positive image associated to it by the incumbents’ propaganda or, conversely, 
they can present themselves as simple co-operative partners, interested in social justice 
and/or ecological sustainability through non-market means. Later on we will present 
case studies that exemplify the large variability that can be found between these two 
extremes, including the case of commercial ventures launched by non-profit institutions 
(Kerlin, 2010, 2013; Salamon & Anheier, 1998) in order to obtain revenues in a context 
of decreased public expenditure.   
Taking this framework as an analytical tool, we have empirically investigated 
the population that owns and manages activities, organizations or initiatives in 
Catalonia that have a particularly social, environmental or community goal and that are 
at least partly based on commercial revenues. We have studied their motivations for 
starting a social enterprise, the characteristics of the ventures and of the individuals who 
lead or founded them, and the relationships with other individuals and entities in the 
field. With these empirical data, we aimed to understand what binds this population and 
what divides them internally, to help us advance the debate.  
In order to fully understand what social entrepreneurship is, Mair (2010) argued 
that it is important to situate the phenomenon in its specific economic and cultural 
context. She emphasized that social entrepreneurship emerges as a reaction to locally 
existing needs that the state or traditional organizations do not address and to the local 
opportunity structure. In this case, we situated our research in the context of Catalonia, 
during the financial crisis and we describe the local context before proceeding to our 
empirical data. Catalonia, like the rest of Spain and other European countries, has an 
important Social Economy sector (both commercial and non-profit), which accounts for 
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6.7% of the total employment (Monzón Campos & Ávila Chaves, 2012), with 
cooperatives being the most common societal form (81.5%, calculated on the basis of 
Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social, 2016). This sector has proven to be resilient 
during the financial crisis (Roelants, Dovgan, Eum, & Terras, 2012, p. 111; EURICSE, 
2013). The crisis is an important temporal context, as the majority of social 
entrepreneurship programs in Catalonia and Spain appeared precisely in this period of 
the crisis (see next section), mostly sponsored by banks and business schools with the 
support of the public administration.  
In the next section, we will describe the emergence of this mostly urban 
phenomenon in Catalonia and in Spain during the financial crisis and identify the main 
actors in the field. Subsequently, we will introduce our empirical investigation. We 
conducted 43 in-depth interviews with social entrepreneurs in 2014 and 2015 and 
launched a web survey that captured data for another 90 entrepreneurs. Furthermore, we 
built a database with 347 organizations and/or ventures in Catalonia that have an 
explicit social/environmental goal. This information was complemented with secondary 
sources and interviews to key informants in the sector. After explaining the data sources 
and methods, we will first present the general tendencies observed in the total sample 
and then describe selected cases in depth in order to highlight the diverse manifestations 
of the phenomenon in Catalonia. Consequently, the findings will be interpreted with the 
aid of the SAF framework in order to provide a better conceptualization of this reality. 
To conclude, we will discuss the findings in the light of the larger debate.  
Social entrepreneurship and the financial crisis in Spain (2010-2014) 
After its inception in the 80’s with the creation of the international network Ashoka 
(Bornstein & Davis, 2010), the concept of social entrepreneurship quickly gained 
popularity among academics, practitioners, and public and private institutions 
worldwide. However, despite the long-standing tradition of social economy in Spain, 
the expression “social entrepreneur” (“emprendedor social” in Spanish, “emprenedor 
                                                          
1 "Overall, CECOP-CICOPA Europe’s annual surveys point out that compared to conventional 
enterprises, worker and social cooperatives are more resilient in countries with a strong level of 
cooperative implantation and experience such as Spain, France and in some sectors in Italy".  
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social” in Catalan) only started to gain importance in Spain from 2010 onwards (see 
Google Trends http://tinyurl.com/y83tm69z).   
 At that time, the unemployment rate in Spain had reached 20% of the active 
population, while youth unemployment surpassed 45% (see Figure 1). In 2010, the 
Socialist government, forced by the European Union to reduce the public debt, 
diminished the salaries of public servants by 5%, froze pensions, and started a policy of 
financial cuts emphatically continued by the Popular Party from 2011 onwards that 
cutback the public budget in Health by 10% on average, Education by almost 20%, and 
Social Protection by almost 13% in just a few years (Conde-Ruiz, Díaz, Marín, & 
Rubio-Ramírez, 2016; del Pino, 2013). This situation, combined with a tax system 
mainly supported by overcharging labor and consumption over capital (Navarro, Torres 
López, & Garzón Espinosa, 2011), put Spain in the highest position of the European 
inequality ranking only surpassed by Cyprus, with almost 30% of the population living 
below the poverty threshold (Hardoon, Ayele, & Fuentes-Nieva, 2016). 
 
Figure 1. Spain – GDP and unemployement rates (2008-2015) 
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During the period 2009-2014, the Spanish financial system received a public 
bailout of 61.5 billion euro. This intervention led to the restructuration of the financial 
system, which concentrated the banking sector in just a few players, and eliminated in 
2014 almost all Cajas de Ahorro (Savings Banks), a historically important non-profit 
institution that represented about half of the Spanish financial sector until that moment. 
The remaining Cajas de Ahorro were transformed into banks, and part of their social 
programs were managed by foundations. This issue is important because in 2008 the 
social expenditure of this sector was approximately 2 billion euro, a figure that was 
reduced to less than a half in 2012 until disappearing in 2014, except for a few remnant 
foundations (Montero, Arcenegui Rodrigo, Martín Lozano, & Carbonero Ruz, 2015). 
As far as each Caja de Ahorro funded and managed its own social program, this void 
was not covered by other institutional actors. In Catalonia, the Caixa de Pensions – La 
Caixa, one of the most important Savings Banks in Spain, did not need a bailout and, 
after splitting itself in a bank and a foundation, it consolidated its dominant position in 
the sector. 
 In sum, the financial crisis deeply transformed the Spanish and Catalan societies, 
which had to face high rates of unemployment, a severe reduction of the public budget 
in health, education, and social protection, and the removal of the Cajas de Ahorros and 
most of its social expenditure. This vacuum was occupied in part by the most important 
banks, which started to launch programs to encourage social entrepreneurship in the 
framework of responsible banking: the Momentum program in 2010, sponsored by the 
bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and the business school ESADE, and, one year later, the 
program of social entrepreneurship launched by the bank La Caixa, with the support of 
IESE Business School. Both programs aim to promote and support social 
entrepreneurship by offering access to financing, counseling, training, and networks to 
promising social ventures. In 2011, the Generalitat de Catalunya (the regional 
government) also launched the program @EmprenSocial to support the development of 
social entrepreneurship initiatives through the organization of meetings, the provision of 
directories of resources, and active communication through the social media.  
 At the European level, the Social Business Initiative was passed in the same year 
with the aim to increase the visibility of “social enterprises”, improving access to 
funding, and exploring European legal forms that can be used for social 
entrepreneurship in Europe (see EUR-lex “COM(2011) 682 final”). On the national 
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level however, Spain has no specific labels, identification schemes or legal regulations 
for social entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurship falls under the more general Law of 
Social Economy that was passed in 2011 (Cf. Capdevila, Álvarez, Chaves & Fajardo 
Gracia, 2014).    
Methodology 
Data for this article were collected in the framework of the research project “Social 
entrepreneurship: local embeddedness, social networking sites and theoretical 
development”, which was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and 
Competitiveness. The project, which was led by the first author, was performed between 
2013 and 2016. 
 In order to delineate the population of social entrepreneurs in Catalonia, we 
adopted a heuristic approach that only took the existing common denominator among 
practitioners and academics described in the introduction as a starting point, without 
imposing further criteria. To operationalize this existing consensus (the achievement of 
social/environmental goals by market means) we first posed  the question used by the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) in its Report on Social Entrepreneurship 
(Hoogendoorn, 2011b; Ryzin, Grossman, DiPadova-Stocks, & Bergrud, 2009; Terjesen, 
Lepoutre, Justo, & Bosma, 2012): “Are you, alone or with others, currently trying to 
start or currently owning and managing any kind of activity, organization or initiative 
that has a particularly social, environmental or community objective?”. The GEM is a 
widely used instrument and the adoption of this question allows future international 
comparisons of our results. Note that this question is meant to capture both the non-
profit sector (associations, foundations, and social enterprises) and the 
social/environmental sector mainly supported by market revenues. Therefore, in order to 
delineate the sample further, we also asked what proportion of the income was 
generated by commercial activities. We excluded cases that did not have and had not 
had any income from commercial activities.  
With this technique, we identified the main actors in the field and conducted 
exploratory interviews during the year 2013 in order to elaborate a list of social 
entrepreneurs and initiatives. We intended to maximize geographical variation in our 
initial approach. Following chains of references, we then interviewed the directors of 43 
social/environmental initiatives during the year 2014 and the first trimester of 2015, 
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after obtaining the respondents' consent. The interviews had two parts: the first part 
collected information about the initiative or organization and about the individual (see 
the section "Measures" below), while the second part was designed to collect data about 
the entrepreneur's support network. The interview typically lasted about two hours and 
it was recorded. The personal network data were collected using the software EgoNet 
(sourceforge.net/projects/egonet). A few days after the interview, the informants 
received a document that gave feedback about the main network characteristics, 
compared with similar anonymous cases we had documented before. The respondents 
we describe in our selection of cases have had an opportunity to read the case 
descriptions and they were asked permission for using their names. A pseudonym was 
used when this permission was not given. 
In addition, we launched a web survey (tinyurl.com/h2zxk46) between October 
and December 2015, using our own database and the mailing lists of several 
associations in the field, among which was the Xarxa d’Economia Solidària (XES, 
xes.cat). In total, 93 respondents completed the survey after a three-month phone 
follow-up. We excluded 1 case from the database that had no income from commercial 
sources, and 2 cases that had already participated in the interviews in order to avoid 
overlapping between the two sources. The web survey addressed the same issues as the 
personal interviews, but it did not include the network module. 
Finally, during the project we built a database of 347 initiatives/organizations 
with social/environmental goals from three sources: our own data, additional databases 
and internet sources, such as the “Map of the Solidarity Economy” of Catalonia (Mapa 
de l’economia solidaria, pamapam.org), and the “Mapa d’Actors de l’Emprenedoria 
Social a Catalunya” (emprenedoriasocial.cat), the roster of services available to social 
entrepreneurs published by the Catalan Government. Of each one of these initiatives, we 
have recorded the form of business ownership, the economic sector, and the 
geographical location. This database includes the 113 cases that participated in the 
interviews and the web-survey, as well as 234 other cases collected from additional 
databases and internet sources. 
 
Measures 
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The interviews and the web survey included questions about the social enterprise such as 
sector, year of creation, form of business ownership, current number of partners, 
employees, and volunteers, annual revenues (in euros), percentage of the total revenues 
generated by selling products or services (in percent), other current sources of revenues, 
sources of capital at the startup, having received support from specific services for social 
entrepreneurs at the startup, and expectations about the future, as well as about the 
entrepreneur (sex, age, educational level, employment status before starting the business 
and other current jobs amongst others, as well as motivations for starting the business). 
 In order to measure the motivations for starting the business, respondents were 
asked to what extent they were driven by (1) social or environmental motives (examples 
that were given were: "to benefit the society or the environment, to help other people"); 
(2) economic motives ("self-employment, to have a (higher) income, to have a larger 
independence at work") and (3) motives of personal fulfillment ("personal satisfaction, 
intellectual or spiritual growth"). Answers for each of the three items were scored on a 5-
point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great deal). A separate category was created 
for the response "I don't know", which was coded as missing for the descriptive analysis. 
 Respondents of the interviews were also asked to rate the importance of social 
media, personal contacts and professional services for the startup, and for the 
development of the enterprise. Specifically, respondents were asked "on a scale from 1 
(not important at all) to 10 (very important), how important have [social media 
platforms/personal contacts and word-of-mouth/professional services and organizations] 
been for the [startup/development] of the enterprise?” A separate category was created 
for the response "I don't know", which was again coded as missing for the descriptive 
analysis. 
 Expectations about the future were measured by asking respondents whether 
they expected that the business would NOT continue to function in five years time 
(interviews) or would continue to function in five years time (web survey). In both 
cases, the response categories were (1) not likely; (2) there is a small probability; (3) 
somewhat likely; (4) very likely. A separate category was created for the response "I 
don't know". 
  In the next section we will present the descriptive statistics of both the survey 
and the compiled database (organizational form, geographical distribution, activity 
sector, year of foundation, total revenues, and entrepreneur’s profile among other 
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information), followed by a selection of five case studies which are meant to cover the 
wide variability of the phenomenon under study.  
 
Results 
This section starts presenting the descriptive statistics of the data gathered for paying 
attention to the study cases hereafter. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the different forms of business ownership in the three 
data sources. While social enterprises in Catalonia can take many different legal forms, 
our results show that the cooperative is the most important societal form among social 
enterprises, followed by the limited society. In the case of the “Database”, the 
traditional nonprofit sector (foundations, work insertion social enterprises and social 
enterprises that employ disabled workers) accounts for 23% of the cases. Finally, 
associations are absent in the web-survey database, most likely due to the absence of 
commercial revenues in many cases2 and/or the high number of missing data associated 
with this method of research. 
Table 1. Societal forms of the social enterprises in the three data sources.  
 
Societal form / 
type organization 
Interviews 
(N=43) 
Web-survey 
(N=90) 
Database 
(N=347) 
Cooperative (all 
forms) 
17 (40%) 33 (57%) 142 (41%) 
Limited company  
(all forms) 
9 (21%) 20 (34%) 93 (27%) 
Foundation  1 (2%) - 46 (13%) 
Work integration 
social enterprise 
and “Centre 
Especial de 
Treball” (disabled 
workers) 
0 (0 %) 2 (3%) 33 (10%) 
Association (all 
forms) 
11 (26%) - 22 (7%) 
                                                          
2 We conducted some interviews with representatives from associations and we found that they did not 
generate commercial revenues; rather, they were funded by public resources and donations. 
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Anonymous 
Society (all forms) 
1 (2%) 3 (5%) 8 (2%) 
Valid N 39 (100%) 58 (100%) 344 (100%) 
Missing / Other* 4  32  3 
*Autonomous worker 
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Figure 2a shows the geographical distribution of cases based on the Database 
records, but cases in the other two sources have a similar distribution. The figure shows 
that the distribution of the 347 social enterprises in our sample coincides with that of the 
general population in Catalonia, i.e., although initiatives are located in the whole area of 
Catalonia, it is highly concentrated in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, showing the 
strongly urban dimension of the phenomenon (Figure 2b).  
  
Figure 2a. Number of initiatives. 2b. Density of population. 
 
 In terms of sector’s activity, services (health, education, communication, 
consultancy) are the most prevalent activity (about 60%), followed by local organic 
production (20%). The word cloud of Figure 3 summarizes these statements. In fact, 
many of the initiatives focus either on social inclusion or on environmental concerns.  
   
Figure 3. Word cloud of the sector. 
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We now turn to the more detailed information collected in the interviews and the 
web survey, starting with the characteristics of the initiatives. Table 2 shows that the 
majority of the social/environmental ventures or organizations analyzed were created in 
the last five years, during the crisis, although some of them were much older: the oldest 
one had been found in 1925. Among the older ones is La Fageda (lafageda.com; 1982), 
a social enterprise that employs mentally ill and intellectually disabled people and 
produces high quality dairy products intended for urban areas and mostly well educated 
people (see the 2014 report by the Ministry of Agriculture at tinyurl.com/hmwww8x). 
This is a very successful cooperative, both in terms of employment creation and returns, 
and in terms of the social value that is created (Elkington & Hartigan, 2008), and it has 
been mentioned in newspaper articles, business reports and documentaries as an 
example of social entrepreneurship in Catalonia (see: www.fageda.com/es/modelo-la-
fageda/recursos-formativos).  
Both in the interviews and in the web survey data, we observed that only a 
minority of the cases had started as an individual initiative; by far the most cases were 
led by at least three partners. The initiatives varied widely in annual revenues and in the 
number of employees, with the enterprises of the respondents we interviewed being on 
average somewhat smaller than the enterprises of the respondents who participated in 
the web survey. However, in both data sources, the majority of the ventures are small in 
size, both in terms of the number of employees (M = 13,3; SD = 30,5, and M=13,8, SD 
= 9,8, respectively, for personal interviews and the web survey), and in terms of 
revenues, generating a median of 20,000€ (interviews) and-140,000€ (web survey) per 
year. The largest part (on average 86% in the interviews and 81% in the web survey) of 
the revenues was generated by commercial means, but this was often complemented 
with other public and private sources. The most frequent sources were subsidies (46%, 
web survey) and donations (18%, web survey); and to a lesser degree, investments, 
contributions of members or business partners, crowd-funding, awards and loans, 
revealing that many enterprises applied a hybrid business model.  
Apart from these sources, some initiatives also relied strongly on volunteering 
time. However, volunteers are mostly concentrated in some specific cases, such as 
Sostre Civic, a case that we will describe in detail in the next section.  
Regarding the startup phase, the table shows that the majority of the ventures 
were mainly created using personal savings, complemented sometimes with small 
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credits or donations. Many of these ventures also received support from professional 
business services for social entrepreneurs in their early stage (43% and 58%, for the 
personal interviews and web survey respectively; see Table 2), which were typically 
assessed as either "quite important for the business" or as "fundamental for the 
business" (not in table). However, when asked to rate their importance, both for the 
startup and for the development of the enterprise (see Table 4), a slightly lower rate was 
given to these professional services, on average, than to social media platforms (our 
respondents used a combination of media, mostly Facebook, twitter, LinkedIn, and 
blogs or webs) and a considerably lower rate than to personal contacts and word-of-
mouth.  
Table 2 further shows that in general, respondents are optimistic about their 
ventures’ future: In both the personal interviews and the web survey, more than 80% of 
the respondents expected that their enterprises will continue to exist in five years time, 
while only a minority had serious concerns about the future.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the social/environmental initiatives 
Variable  Descriptive 
statistics 
Interview data 
(N = 43) 
Web-survey data 
(N = 90) 
Year of creation  Range: 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
1925-2013 
2009 
2004 (17.0) 
43 
1940-2015 
2010 
2005 (13.2) 
90 
Main source of capital at 
startup 
 
N (%) per category: 
Personal savings 
Bank credits 
Loans family/friends 
 Other 
Valid N:  
 
11 (26.2%) 
 2   (4.8%) 
 5 (11.9%) 
8 (19.0%) 
42 
 
46 (56.8%) 
8 (9.9%) 
2 (2.5%) 
21 (25.9%) 
81 
Start-up support                N (%) per category: 
Yes  
No 
Valid N:  
 
18 (42.9%) 
24 (57.1%) 
42  
 
50 (57.5%) 
37 (42.5%) 
87  
Current annual revenues  
 
Range: 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
15,000 - 40,000,000 
20.000 
1,225,374 (6,167,370) 
43 
4,000 - 17,000,000 
140,000 
2,076,779 (4,485,855) 
42 
Percentage of revenues 
obtained commercially                   
Range: 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
0-100% 
100 % 
85.8% (30.2%) 
41 
10-100% 
100% 
80.9% (31.1%) 
26 
Other main source of 
income currently 
 
N (%) per category: 
No other sources 
Subsidy 
Donations 
Crowd-funding 
Inversion 
 
 
 
(Freelist, most 
nominated: subsidies) 
 
3 (3.3%) 
41 (45.6%) 
16 (17.8%) 
8 (8.9%) 
8 (8.9%) 
2 (2.2%) 
15 
 
Contribution 
partners 
Others 
Valid N: 
8 (8.9%) 
90 
Number of partners 
 
N (%) per category: 
0 partners  
1 partner  
2 partners  
3 or more partners  
Valid N: 
 
5 (13.2%) 
5 (13.2%) 
9 (23.7%) 
19 (50.0%) 
38 
 
0 (0.0%) 
2 (2.2%) 
6 (6.7%) 
82 (91.1%) 
90 
Number of employees  
 
Range: 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
0 - 174 
3.0 
13.3 (30.5) 
43 
1 - 32 
13.5 
13.8 (9.8) 
90 
Number of volunteers 
 
Range: 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
0 - 90 
0 
5.3 (16.8) 
41 
0 - 1500 
0 
24.9 (160.0) 
90 
Expectations future 
 
"How likely do you 
think it is that your 
enterprise will not 
survive / survive in five 
years time?" 
 
N (%) per category: 
Not very likely 
A little likely 
Quite likely 
Very likely 
I don´t know 
Valid N: 
NOT survive 
22 (51.2%) 
16 (37.2%) 
4 (9.3%) 
1 (2.3%) 
0 (0.0%) 
43 
Survive 
1 (1.9%) 
2 (3.8%) 
17 (32.1%) 
27 (50.9%) 
6 (11.3%) 
53 
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 Finally, it is important to mention that the ventures and organizations 
represented in our sample are not isolated, but instead they are associated and federated 
in several ways, following the tradition of the social economy, which emphasizes 
cooperation as a central tenet of the sector. Figures 4 and 5 report the most common 
institutions to which the entities are associated, and the social/environmental initiatives 
most well-known to the web survey respondents, respectively. Figure 4 shows that 
many ventures were associated to the Xarxa d'Economía Solidària (the Network of 
Solidary Economy), and to Coop57, a cooperative that offers ethically and solidarity-
focused financial services. Among the most well-known social enterprises (see Figure 
5) are Som Energia, a case that we will describe below and that provides green energy 
to many initiatives, l'Olivera (a work integration cooperative), and La Fageda. The 
level of internal cooperation is further illustrated by the fact that respondents from the 
web survey were able to mention a average of no less than 25 other 
social/environmental initiatives in Catalonia (not in tables). 
 
Figure 4. Ventures were associated to the Xarxa d'Economía Solidària. 
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Figure 5. Most well-known social enterprises. 
 
Regarding the individual attributes of social entrepreneurs (see Table 3), we 
found striking coincidences with the Report on Social Enterpreneurship of the GEM and 
other related surveys (see Hoogendoorn, 2011a), namely that this population is 
predominantly male (61% for interviews; 63% for web survey), on average middle aged 
(M = 40,2, SD = 8,0 for interviews; M = 42,9, SD = 10,6 for web survey); ), and highly 
educated (more than 80% has university education for both interviews and web survey). 
In terms of former employment, we observed quite some diversity. The web survey 
further showed that most of the entrepreneurs were employed before starting the venture 
(67%), but others were unemployed (9%), students (9%), or self-employed (16%). Part 
of the former employees had precarious or temporal jobs, but there were also a 
substantial number of directors, government employees, lawyers, psychologists, 
consultants, teachers, graphic and industrial designers, among others (not in table). 
Furthermore, social entrepreneurs indicated that they are primarily driven by 
social/environmental and personal development motivations (Urbano, Toledano, & 
Soriano, 2010), both of which they typically assessed as "very important" motives for 
starting the venture (4.6, interviews, and 4.7, web survey, on a scale from 1 to 5; see 
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Table 3). Economic motivations however also had some importance, as respondents 
typically indicated that they considered them "a little" (personal interviews) or "quite" 
important (web survey). When asked to choose which of the motives was the most 
important (not in table), economic motives fell clearly behind the other two types. Even 
so, for 5% (interviews) and 12% of the cases (web survey) economic motives were 
reported as the most important motive to start the venture, indicating that some see 
social entrepreneurship mainly as a route to self-employment. Also, in the personal 
interviews, 42% of the respondents indicated that they had a combination of motivations 
(this category was not present in the web survey). Indeed, our impression from the 
personal interviews was that social motivations were genuine, but that they were often 
mixed with economic motivations. 
Finally, a sizable proportion of respondents had other, usually part-time 
occupations at the time of the interview (42% for the interviews, and 30% for the web 
survey; see Table 3), indicating that their initiatives did not always provide them with 
sufficient income.   
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the social entrepreneurs 
Variable  Descriptive statistics Interviews  
(N = 43) 
Web-survey  
(N = 90) 
Gender:                                           N (%) per category: 
Male  
Female 
Valid N: 
 
26 (60.5%) 
17 (39.5%) 
43 
 
56 (62.9%) 
33 (37.1%) 
89 
Age:  
 
Range: 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
25 - 66 
39 
40.2 (8.0) 
43 
21 - 67 
42 
42.9 (10.6) 
88 
Education: 
 
N (%) per category: 
Primary school 
Secondary school 
Interm. prof. education 
Higher prof. education 
University diploma 
University BA degree 
University MA degree 
University PhD degree 
Other 
Valid N: 
 
  1   (2.3%) 
  2   (4.7%) 
  1   (2.3%) 
  2   (4.7%) 
  5 (11.6%) 
21 (48.8%) 
10 (23.3%) 
  1   (2.3%) 
- 
43 
 
  0   (0.0%) 
  8   (9.1%) 
  1   (1.1%) 
  5   (5.7%) 
  9 (10.2%) 
30 (34.1%) 
30 (34.1%) 
  3   (3.4%) 
  2   (2.3%) 
88   
Previous occupation: 
 
N (%) per category: 
Autonomous 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Student 
Valid N: 
 
 
No information 
available 
 
13 (16.0%) 
54 (66.7%) 
  7   (8.6%) 
  7   (8.6%) 
81 
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Current other occupation: 
 
N (%) per category: 
Full-time employment 
Part-time employment 
Other  
No 
Valid N: 
 
  5 (11.6%) 
13 (30.2%) 
[category not included] 
25 (58.1%) 
43 
 
  3   (3.6%) 
11 (13.3%) 
11 (13.3%) 
58 (69.9%) 
83 
Motivation:  
Social / environmental 
(scale 1-5) 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
5 
4.6 (0.5) 
33 
5 
4.7 (0.7) 
83 
Motivation:  
Personal development 
(scale 1-5) 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
5 
4.7 (0.6) 
33 
5 
4.6 (0.9) 
84 
Motivation:  
Economic 
(scale 1-5) 
Median:  
Mean (SD): 
Valid N: 
2 
2.1 (1.2) 
33 
4 
3.8 (1.3) 
85 
Motivation:  
Most important 
 
N (%) per category: 
Social / environm. 
Personal development 
Economic 
Combination 
Don´t know 
Valid N: 
 
  9 (20.9%) 
  8 (18.6%) 
  2   (4.7%) 
14 (42.4%) 
  0   (0.0%) 
33 
 
42 (48.3%) 
28 (32.2%) 
10 (11.5%) 
[categories not included] 
  7   (8.0%) 
87 
 
Table 4. Importance of social media platforms, personal contacts and professional 
services during the start-up and during the development of the enterprise 
Importance of ... on a 
scale from 1 to 10 
Start-up  
M (SD) 
Development 
M (SD) 
Social media platforms 
 
4.9 (3.6) 6.6 (2.7) 
Personal contacts and 
word-of-mouth 
9.2 (1.0) 8.8 (1.2) 
Professional services and 
organizations 
3.8 (3.6) 5.2 (3.3) 
 
 
Case studies 
After having presented the general tendencies in our data, we will now describe five of 
the cases in order to explore the different meanings that the phenomenon can take when 
we adopt a definition based on the existing consensus among academics and 
practitioners, that is, organizations that achieve social/environmental goals by market 
means, or a combination of market means and public or private funding. We have 
chosen to select cases that had overcome the survival stage (Churchill & Lewis, 1983) 
and could therefore be considered as successful, as these are more meaningful for 
understanding what the phenomenon entails. Furthermore, we have selected cases that 
represented different manifestations of the phenomenon in the context of Catalonia, to 
explore what meanings are attached to this definition.   
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Our first case is SostreCivic (sostrecivic.coop), a cooperative that provides 
solutions for housing individuals and families who cannot afford to pay the rent at 
market prices in touristic cities as Barcelona. Raül Robert, the founder of SostreCivic, 
has received us patiently in his workplace several times, a "co-working" space in the 
center of Barcelona. He was awarded as Ashoka Fellow in 2010, and he indeed meets 
the ideal definition of a social entrepreneur, although, as he states, he never thought of 
himself as such before. He had the idea for the cooperative when he experienced 
difficulties to access affordable housing himself and observed similar problems in his 
environment. As an industrial engineer, with experience in a European project on social 
and ecological housing solutions, and inspired by social movements such as the MST 
(Landless Workers' Movement) in Brazil, a movement that fights for access to the land 
of poor workers through land reform, he took the decision to start on his own a 
cooperative for meeting this societal problem, first on a part-time and afterwards on a 
full-time basis. After some years of activity, he and his associates have been able to 
influence the Catalan housing law, to cooperate with public and private institutions and 
professionals in order to find innovative solutions for each case or project, located 
mostly in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, and to build up a thriving community 
with partners, volunteers, and people interested in this kind of solutions.  
 La Tavella (latavella.cat), our second case, produces and commercializes local 
organic products as a means to provide suitable jobs, and personalized attention to 
disabled workers (11 out of 14 employees in 2014). The commercial venture (a Limited 
Company) was developed by two non-profit associations with a long trajectory in the 
field of attention to disabled people through gardening initiatives (Sant Tomàs and 
Fundació Viver de Bell-lloc, respectively), as a means to overcome the cuts in the third 
sector. For this aim, they hired LJJ (pseudonym), an experienced professional, as a 
manager in 2011. Since his incorporation, the project has experienced a fast growth, 
doubling every year the revenues, and a deep organizational transformation from a non-
profit to a commercial model. From the beginning, the successful case of La Fageda 
(see previous section) was taken as a model to follow, and LJJ visited different 
social/environmental projects in Europe in order to get ideas on organic products. In 
Belgium he found an institution very similar to La Tavella, based on a prosperous 
business model that helped him to define his own corporative strategy. The initiative 
was awarded during the first edition of the Momentum project, and this support was 
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very important for the venture because LJJ could develop a business plan with 
professional advice and received a grant for starting up the business. The transition from 
a non-profit entity funded by the traditional Cajas de Ahorro to a business-oriented 
organization has not been easy, but the balance is assessed as positive.  
The third case is Co-Shop (coshopcollection.com, a project from Capipota 
Productions, a Limited Company) that distributes fashionable garments from local 
producers and designers, and NGOs that employ women in risk of exclusion. This 
initiative was started primarily as a means to create self-employment, but the owners 
also wished to address social and environmental concerns. SM (architect) and TN 
(engineer), concerned with the environmental impact of the garment industry, started 
the business in 2011 with the support of financial credits from both the state and 
autonomous public programs, and especially from the Momentum project in 2014 that 
had the same positive impact as in the previous case for developing the business. Co-
Shop presents itself as a “collaborative shop with local fashion designers”. Currently it 
has four shops in Barcelona, and it is starting to offer a franchise for opening other 
shops in Spain. Recently the initiative has been awarded by the city council of 
Barcelona as well.  
 So far, we have discussed three initiatives that have been awarded by different 
entrepreneurship programs, and consequently they have received considerable support 
at an early stage of the businesses. Our fourth case, Som Energia (somenergia.coop) is 
possibly the most outstanding case of business success in Spain in the last years, but it 
has never been awarded by one of the social entrepreneurship programs. Som Energia 
was started in 2010 by Gijsbert Huijink, who had obtained a Master Degree in Business 
Innovation and Technology Development at the University of Girona two years earlier. 
At the time that Som Energia was launched, he was an assistant professor in Economics 
at the same university. Gijsbert became interested in renewable energy when he was 
trying to find a solution for his own house. In the end, he decided to install solar panels 
and batteries, and when studying the possibility to invest in a wind turbine, the 
cooperative model came up. No cooperative in renewable energy existed at the time in 
Spain, so he started Som Energia with the aid of a few friends and students. Gijsbert had 
previous management experience as co-owner of a successful furniture company in 
Romania, expertise that was applied to the new venture. Soon, the cooperative had to 
face the reality of the energetic model in Spain, an oligopolistic, highly regulated sector 
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where small players had no real chances to succeed. Instead of incentivizing green 
energy, the government has introduced taxes to solar energy, which hinders the 
emergence of energy cooperatives. With small grants, and against the predictions of 
business consultants, the cooperative has grown and nowadays it has over 33,000 
members, more than 47,000 contracts, operates in different regions in Spain, and owns 
facilities for producing green electricity that account for almost 5% of all their energy 
sales. The growth continues at a good pace. In addition, Som Energia not only involves 
their partners in the generation of new projects (offering a fair return of the investment), 
but helps them actively to reduce their domestic energy consumption, and consequently, 
their negative impact on the environment. One of the keys of success of Som Energia is 
its social movement approach: members are not only conceived as consumers but also 
as activists committed to change the societal energy model. In this regard, currently 
there are 26 local action groups in Spain that advocate actively for this change of 
paradigm.  
 The final case is also quite different. CAT Coop (we use a pseudonym in this 
case) is a cooperative federation that was launched in 2010 under the principles of self-
employment, financial independence, non-compliance of (imposed) tax regulations, and 
environmental sustainability. CAT Coop headquarters are located in a business area of 
Barcelona city. The federation aims to contribute to the transformation of society 
towards a more democratic and sustainable model than offered by the capitalist market. 
In fact, they explicitly refuse to use the “social entrepreneurship” label. The Cooperative 
promotes the use of social currencies (currencies of local use), solidarity values, 
cooperation, and gives priority and concern to social needs over economic profit. All the 
cooperatives that wish to become members of the federation have to demonstrate that 
their organic, social or industrial projects meet a series of environmental/social 
standards in order to develop their activities within the cooperative3. This point 
forcefully illustrates their discourse and practice, distinct from that of the establishment 
and the mainstream society, and their willingness to think outside the box and create an 
alternative world. The use of social currencies instead of the euro is promoted by the 
cooperative, offering a web-based platform to facilitate the exchanges. However, in 
reality the participants do use euros in their internal transactions, because beyond the 
                                                          
3 When we presented our research project to the executive committee for obtaining their collaboration in 
the research, their main objection to collaborate with us was precisely that we were funded by the Spanish 
government. 
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self-provisioning ideal, they still rely on market exchanges for making a living. In 2015, 
more than 600 projects (ranging from health services to industrial products) were 
associated to the federation, with thousands of persons making a living in this 
institutional framework. Nonetheless, only one person from this federation collaborated 
with us, although we had the opportunity to interview two associated initiatives.  
 From the description of these five cases, it is clear that the respondents who use 
the label of social entrepreneurship for their initiatives, or quite the contrary, who 
actively refuse to use that label, have very different motivations, trajectories, business 
models and levels of support obtained.  This diversity of the five cases shows the 
existence of a contested field, with two alternative definitions struggling in unequal 
competition.  
 
Summary and interpretation based on the SAF framework 
From the data presented in this article, a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding 
the phenomenon of social entrepreneurship in Catalonia. First of all, we conclude that 
we face a new field that has emerged during the process of profound change that the 
Catalan society has experienced during the financial crisis (2008-2014), a societal 
change that it is still continuing. This new field can be conceptualized as an emergent 
Strategic Action Field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). In this field, the main players of 
the financial sector occupied the vacuum left by the Saving Banks and started to 
actively promote social entrepreneurship programs with the positive sanction of Public 
Administration. With this move, they started to regulate the new field disseminating a 
label and a prescriptive definition that is coherent with their market ideology, and 
linking banks to positive social/environmental values in times of financial downturn. In 
this new scenario, with millions of unemployed people and a declining role of the 
welfare state, mostly highly educated people in urban areas started (and keep starting) 
socially/environmentally oriented ventures with their own savings and the aid of social 
connections as their main assets, but with an important network of both public and 
private startup resources at their disposal. We contend that we are facing a mostly urban 
mobilization driven by people with both post-materialistic values (Inglehart, 1977, 
2009), and the need to make a living in the new post-crisis scenario. In this regard, we 
have shown that some of these initiatives are primarily developed in order to create self-
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employment opportunities. In addition, traditional non-profit institutions have started 
commercial businesses (like in the case of La Tavella) in order to face the disappearance 
of the Cajas de Ahorros, and its social expenditure along with the global reduction of 
the public budget in areas of social policy (Moulaert & Ailenei, 2005; Weisbrod, 1998). 
The positive image associated with “social entrepreneurship” due to the public 
endorsement of the incumbent definition, and the material rewards that some programs 
provide to selected initiatives, explain that most of these new entrepreneurs 
("challengers" in SAF terminology) presented themselves in this way, and that the 
tension experienced with the non-profit sector when starting commercial ventures can 
be better managed by adopting this denomination (cf. Witkamp, Royakkers, & Raven, 
2011).  
A second interesting observation is the level of commitment of the population 
under study with social/environmental goals. Even though some initiatives were mostly 
created for self-employment, we observed during the interviews that social or 
environmental motivations were genuine. We suggest that it is not just a feature of 
social entrepreneurs, but a feature of well-educated people in advanced economies who 
tend to hold “post-materialistic” values (Inglehart, 2009) and pursue meaningful jobs 
(Overell, 2008). In the interviews the sense of self-realization and the genuine 
social/environmental concern of our informants were recurrent, even in cases of 
precarious subsistence. Therefore, the startup of a social/environmental oriented venture 
can be seen as a type of activism and a natural consequence of the structure of 
opportunities available for a certain level of education and experience more likely to be 
found in urban settings.  
A third interesting finding is that this new sector has to present itself as a 
cooperative venture in order to meet the historic and resilient sector of the Social 
Economy in Catalonia and Spain, despite that initiatives are often portrayed in the 
media as an achievement of individual “champions”, “heroes”, or “change makers”. 
Sostre Civic and Som Energia are two examples of cooperatives that could easily be 
portrayed as examples of “heroes” or “individual change makers”. However, it is 
through the institutional and well-connected world of the social economy that all these 
concerns and initiatives are expressed. Even the limited companies present themselves 
as Co-X or “co-entrepreneurship”. In this regard, it is interesting that a training program 
for social innovations, the program estArter, developed by the Institute of Government 
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and Public Policy (IGOP) of the Autonomous University of Barcelona (estarter.cat), 
precisely focuses on the collective and collaborative approach for developing social 
ventures. This level of cooperation is instrumental in keeping the SAF together.  
 Last, we observed that the field also integrates the collaborative anti-system and 
anti-market initiatives (such as the case Cat Coop we described earlier), an important 
issue in our view. Taking the traditional Social Economy as a model, about 600 projects 
were created intentionally outside the market and the euro (see the case Cat Coop 
described above), challenging the SAF by framing a totally different meaning that 
describes the process as “dispossession”, and “structural inequality” provoked by banks, 
and oligopolistic capitalism (see Harvey, 2007). While occupying the same institutional 
space as the entrepreneurs mentioned above who conform with the general logic and 
rules of the SAF, and offering similar ways for making a living through self-occupation 
compatible with a post-materialistic value system, and collaboration, the latter actors 
oppose to the use of the term "social entrepreneurship", and do not agree with the 
former group about the purpose and rules of the field and the position of some actors 
(such as banks) in it. We can therefore speak of an unsettled or disputed SAF where two 
sets of actors, the incumbents and the opposing challengers respectively, provide 
competing definitions of the new scenario.  
In this context, we can understand that the questions “who are social 
entrepreneurs?” or “what is social entrepreneurship?” are too vague. Beyond 
epistemological debates we are facing a complex reality where the label “social 
entrepreneur” has recently been promoted and imposed top-down, and where different 
kinds of actors use or refuse to use it depending on their own interests and objectives.   
 
Conclusions and limitations 
Although Catalonia has a long social economy tradition (Reventós, 1960), the analysis 
shows a significant rise of social entrepreneurship initiatives since 2008, when the large 
financial crisis began. The causes of this emergence are multi-factorial: first, it is due in 
part to a strong momentum of social entrepreneurship created by European, Spanish and 
Catalan institutions. Banking foundations and business schools that have led a real 
transformation of this sector added to the momentum. Second, the decline of the welfare 
state and the disappearance of the Cajas de Ahorros (Savings Banks) had produced a 
26 
 
void (in terms of providing solutions to social and environmental problems) that was 
filled by these new initiatives, in many cases started by non-profit parties. Third, the 
high rates of unemployment and job insecurity resulting from the economic crisis has 
encouraged various forms of self-employment. Among these forms we highlight the 
social, health or environmental initiatives of people who have lost their jobs in the 
administration or in the non-profit sector. Fourth, and in relation to the latter, a large 
segment of the population with high levels of education and post-material aspirations 
(i.e., incentives beyond salary, such as social justice, solidarity, sustainability, equity, 
etc.) has found a meaningful job in these social initiatives (Overell, 2008), even though 
they may be worse off economically or in terms of labor conditions. The search of 
meaningful work (beyond economic profit) is a key issue for many of these new 
entrepreneurs, specifically for the highly educated living in urbanized areas.  
The redefinition of the entrepreneurial space has subsumed different and varied 
initiatives under the same label (i.e., “social entrepreneurship”), from Foundations to 
Limited Societies, Anonymous Societies, Insertion Companies and most of all, 
Cooperatives. Due to the positive image associated to it, entrepreneurs in Catalonia 
chose to adopt this label, emphasizing the collective nature of the venture, in accordance 
with the strong cooperative tradition. Conversely, an important number of sustainable 
and meaningful initiatives developed within the cooperative framework refuse to adopt 
this label for its market-oriented and individualistic nature. We suggest that this reaction 
shows that the strategic action field is unsettled and its evolution difficult to foresee at 
this moment.   
Our study has some limitations of which we are well aware. The most obvious 
limitation is the difficulty of collecting reliable data for several reasons. On the one 
hand, the high mortality of these businesses makes it difficult to establish an 
unequivocal census. In addition, obtaining respondents' collaboration has been a 
particularly tough task in this research: entrepreneurs are busy and unlikely to answer to 
lengthy surveys or interviews, but in addition, some politically driven entrepreneurs 
were actually reluctant to cooperate with what they interpreted as the “establishment”. 
On the other hand, the legal form in which companies are presented is heterogeneous, 
and sometimes they have several legal forms at the same time. As a matter of fact, the 
concept of “social entrepreneurship” is relatively new in Spain and some enterprises do 
not highlight the keywords that facilitate their identification as social initiatives 
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(sustainability, social justice, etc.) on their website. For these reasons, even though our 
sample of social enterprises in Catalonia has a size (133 when we combine personal 
interviews and the web survey) that approaches the number of social enterprises that 
participated in the GEM Social Enterpreneurship survey for the whole of Spain (160), 
and our database is twice as large, we have to stress that it is not a random sample, and 
it may present biases. Nevertheless, the internal variation that the data display is an 
observed reality.  
To conclude, we contend that in this complex societal transformation, “social 
entrepreneurs” are primarily those individuals who are awarded as such by 
homonymous funding programs. This is mostly an urban phenomenon, whose dwellers 
are facing profound societal changes, to which they are reacting with initiatives more 
suited to their values, education, and material conditions of life in a market economy. 
Possibly we are facing a global trend. On the other hand, other people with the same 
social/environmental concerns, and the same capacity to mobilize resources for 
“changing the world”, are comfortably installed either in the cooperative or in anti-
market sectors. The cowl does make the difference.  
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